Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1999

Copyright and Intermediate Users' Rights
Jane C. Ginsburg
Columbia Law School, jane.ginsburg@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Intermediate Users' Rights, 23 COLUM.-VLA J. L. & ARTS 67 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3516

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

Essay: Copyright and Intermediate Users' Rights
by Jane C. Ginsburg*
The impending "Digital Millennium" has amplified the assertion of users' rights
in U.S. copyright law. Copyright has been reimagined as a "law of users' rights"'
whose acolytes caution copyright owners not to stand as piggish impediments to the
progress of learning and culture in the Digital Age.2 Proponents advance a variety of
arguments in support of a user rights construct of copyright law, from the historical
to the philosophical to the pragmatic. I propose to address some of these. But first it
is important to specify what I mean by "users' rights" in U.S. copyright law today.
User rights in fact come in several guises, some of them sheltering commercial
self-interest. In the past, I have analyzed "consumptive" end-user claims to personal
enjoyment and convenience through private copying.' In this essay, I would instead
like to consider some examples of intermediate entrepreneurs' claims of right to free
exploitation of copyrighted works. One concerns intermediaries that redisseminate
copyrighted works without their authors' or proprietors' permission, notably remote
radio broadcasts, and articles on events of current news interest. Another concerns
works that spin off from a prior work's popularity. What underlies these claims and,
for me, binds them to consumptive user rights demands, is their common invocation
of a public interest in access to information and culture. In the former instance, the
third party, by enlarging the works' audience, arguably is stimulating public debate
on matters of public concern. In the latter case, the unauthorized user is offering new
items of popular culture to a public whose demand for new variations on tried and
true works is increasingly insatiable. So far, U.S. courts have not proved especially
hospitable to assertions of the rights of intermediate users, but it is conceivable that
the rhetoric employed to advance the cause of end-users may come to erode authors'
protections against intermediaries as well.
Let us start with the asserted public interest in access to learning and culture. Were
Ito state that it appears to be an interest that users demand that authors subsidize, I
would be betraying an author-centric view of copyright. After all, one might advance
the opposite contention, that authors' rights take a bite out of the public's pie, and that
the size of the author's slice should be shaped by the public's claims. In other words,
users' rights are not an exception to copyright; copyright is the exception to the
public's general right to enjoy works of authorship.
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This is not a new notion in Anglo-American copyright law. Lord Macaulay once
pronounced copyright a "tax on readers for the benefit of authors," and therefore
"exceedingly bad." 4 (He also, however, acknowledged the need to "liberally
remunerate" authors in order to ensure a "supply of good books," and conceded that
copyright was the "least objectionable" means to this goal.5 )
This brings me to the historical articulation of the author-user relationship in
copyright. Let us suppose that "in the beginning was the Reader." And the Reader,
in a Pirandello-esque flash of insight, went in search of an Author, for the Reader
realized that without an Author, there could be no Readers. But when the Reader met
an Author, the Author, anticipating Dr. Johnson, retorted, "No man but a blockhead
ever wrote except for money.' 6
And the Reader calculated the worth of a free supply of blockhead-written works
against the value of recognizing the Author's economic self-interest. She concluded
that the author's interest is also her interest, that the "public interest" encompasses
both that of authors and of readers. So she looked upon copyright, and saw that it was
good.
This, in essence, is the philosophy that informs the 1787 U.S. Constitution's
copyright clause: "Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress of Science
by securing to Authors... for limited Times the exclusive Right to their Writings.
•."7 The means to advance learning is by securing authors' exclusive rights. Note
the word "securing": it implies reinforcement of a preexisting right, not creation of
a new one. James Madison's endorsement in the Federalist Papers of the Constitutional copyright clause confirms this understanding, for he adverted to copyright's
status as a right at common law - the closest thing in U.S. jurisprudence to an
enforceable natural right. Madison also declared that "the public good fully coincides
... with the claims of individuals." 8 Many pre-constitutional laws of the thirteen new
states also stressed the natural justice of authors' claims, and equated the public
benefit with enforcement of authors' rights. 9
This is not to deny the existence of a strong streak of copyright skepticism in U.S.
jurisprudence. Indeed, the incentive rationale for copyright invites its own rebuttal.
For one thing, we may have an ample supply of "blockheads" - poets who burn with
inner fire, for whom creation is its own reward, or for whom other gainful employment permits authorial altruism. These creators do not need the incentive of exclusive
rights in order to produce works of authorship. As to this group of authors, then,
copyright is a wasteful windfall. Moreover, even if the incentive rationale justified
some copyright protection, we may be allowing too much. That is, the scope of
copyright protection - particularly the derivative works right- may be more generous
than is needed to spur initial creativity.
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Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech before the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in T.B.

MACAULAY, PROSE AND POETRY 733-34 (G.M. Young ed., 1952).

5.
6

7.
8.
9.

Id.
Samuel Johnson, in BARTLt's FAMIUAR QUOTATIONS 316 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See THE FEDERAUST No. 43 (James Madison).
See, e.g., Francine Crawford, Pre-Conslitutional Copyright Statutes, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT

SOC'Y 11 (1975).

1999]

COPYRIGHT AND INTERMEDIATE USERS' RIGHTS

In the abstract, this approach may have some appeal, but it also has considerable
practical disadvantages. For example, the scope of a work's protection could not be
known ex ante (thus permitting predictability in licensing), but would only be
discovered in the course of an infringement proceeding, in which the court would
address the question whether this incentive was necessary to create this work.
Obviously, it also is rather difficult to project how one would show whether or not
copyright was a necessary incentive in a given case. Then-Professor (now Justice)
Stephen Breyer famously wrote that the case for the copyright incentive rationale has
not really been made'0 - but neither, I would suggest, has the case against it. It
depends who has the burden of proof: authors to justify copyright, or users to justify
non-protection.
If the incentive rationale fails to persuade, let us consider supplemental rationales
for authors' rights. A principal alternative, the misappropriation or unjust enrichment
rationale, also has shortcomings. Here the argument would be: Regardless of the
incentive that copyright may or may not have provided this author, this user is getting
something for nothing, and therefore has misappropriated something of value. The
problem here, as before, is the argument's circularity. Getting something for nothing
is wrongful only if the "something" was subject to claims of private right. In effect,
this contention "proves" the existence of the property right by pointing to third
parties' desire to "steal" it." But, of course, there's no theft if there's no property.
What's left? The original common law basis of copyright, rooted in the author's
natural right to the fruits of her intellectual labor. This basis justifies authors' moral
claims as well as economic rights - at least up to a point. That point may be where
second authors add their intellectual labor to the first author's contribution. This is
one source of the claims of "transformative" users - users who copy from other works
in order to build on them in the creation of an independent work, notably one of
criticism or of commentary. In U.S. "fair use" doctrine, "transformative" uses hold
a strong claim to exemption from liability for infringement. 2
Arguably, transformative user claims should sweep more broadly, to exempt all
third party derivative works, such as dramatizations of literary works. After all, to
adapt the novel to a play or a film, the adapting author would have had to invest
considerable intellectual labor and other resources. Moreover, referring back to the
"supply of good books" rationale, the public will have more works to enjoy or to learn
from if more authors may expand on their predecessors' works.
The response to this kind of contention, in positive law, is that the novelist's
copyright includes the right to make derivative works; 3 that the adaptation invades
the market for the derivative works the novelist could create or license, thereby
undermining the package of incentives the copyright affords; the adapting author

10.
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case ForCopyright, 84 HARV. L REV. 281 (1970).
II.
Cf Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) (Holmes, J.) ("That
these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the desire to reproduce them
without regard to the plaintiffs' rights.").
12.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Pierre N. Leval, Toward
a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990).
13.
See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1997).
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would be getting the benefit of a derivative works license, without paying the price.
Admittedly, one might say the same thing about transformative uses that criticize or
comment on the novel, but there, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that there is
"no market" for critical comment. 4 If the first author's property right is coextensive
with the market for her works, and if in this case there is "no market," then the
adapting author has not invaded any right of control that the author enjoys. Where the
transformation does not comment or criticize, however, we are back in the realm of
the author's direct and derivative markets; then the addition of a second author's labor
does not suffice to justify the unlicensed derivative work.
This brings me to the second of the user rights examples I mentioned - the
unlicensed creation of a work that "spins off" and capitalizes on the popularity of a
prior work. In Castle Rock Entertainment,Inc. v. CarolPublishingGroup, Inc., 5 the
producers of the television show Seinfeld brought an infringement claim against the
publisher of the "Seinfeld Aptitude Test," a trivia quiz book about the phenomenally
popular show. The publisher asserted a fair use defense, raising two principal
grounds. First, the publisher asserted that the quiz book was a work of commentary
that enabled readers to participate in and deconstruct television culture. Defendant
touted the quiz book "as a work 'decod[ing] the obsession with ... and mystique that
surround[s] 'Seinfeld',' by 'critically restructur[ing] [Seinfeld's mystique] into a
system complete with varying levels of 'mastery' that relate the reader's control of the
' '' 6
show's trivia to knowledge of and identification with their hero, Jerry Seinfeld. "
Defendant further contended that the quiz book "'is a quintessential example of
critical text of the TV environment... expos[ing] all of the show's nothingness to
articulate its true motive forces and its social and moral dimensions.""' . Second, the
defendant stressed that Jerry Seinfeld had repeatedly declined to create or authorize
a trivia quiz book: since he was not exploiting this submarket, defendant contended
that there could be no market harm to plaintiff if someone else did.
The court rejected both grounds. Dispensing with the claim that the quiz book was
a transformative commentary, the court found that the quiz book's purpose "is to
repackage Seinfeld to entertain Seinfeld viewers . . . not to expose Seinfeld's
'nothingness', but to satiate Seinfeld fans' passion for the 'nothingness' that Seinfeld
has elevated into the realm of protectable creative expression."" In other words, the
defendant's use was more parasitic than transformative; defendant did not contribute
sufficient intellectual labor. The court suggested that had the quiz questions and
answers attempted to parody the show, the fair use defense might have been on firmer
ground.
This feature of the Castle Rock decision illustrates the delicacy of a court's task
in cases alleging unlicensed spin offs from a plaintiff's popular work; how does one
tell the difference between an unexcused commercial exploitation that violates the
derivative works right, on the one hand, and a fair-use qualifying commentary on the

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

See Campbell, 510 U.S. 569.
150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
Id. at 142 (alterations in original).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 142-43.
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other? The situation may have seemed clear in the Seinfeld case, but consider another
claim involving the same defendant, currently pending before the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals. 9 There, the work at issue is a guide to the television show Star
Trek, promoted as containing everything the uninitiate needs to know about the show
before taking a "trekkie" out for a date. The book summarizes plot lines and exposes
characters, often in a bantering tone, with ironic asides. Is the sarcasm of its
presentation sufficient to range the work as a commentary with a strong claim to fair
use? On the one hand, ponderous academic tomes on high art are not the only
beneficiaries of the fair use exception; humorous analysis of popular culture may also
qualify. On the other hand, we should be leery of a rule that all a second-comer need
do is lace its version with a few jokes, to turn an infringing derivative work into a fair
use.
Now let us turn to the Seinfeld defendant's second ground for a finding of fair use:
Where the author has refused to exploit a particular market niche, third parties should
be permitted to occupy that market, since there is no market harm to the author, and
the public will benefit from the availability of a new work that the author would not
supply. This contention might seem attractive under the "supply of books" rationale,
especially since the third party is not competing with the author for that market niche.
In fact, however, the argument is quite pernicious, and the Second Circuit was correct
to reject it.
First, Jerry Seinfeld testified that he had repeatedly declined to create or license
a trivia quiz book because he wished to devote his creative efforts to the television
show; he feared that the writing or supervision of a quiz book that met his standards
of quality would distract him from his principal artistic goal.' 0 Copyright entitles
authors to make the creative choices regarding what additional, related, works to
undertake, but the Seinfeld defendant's argument would have had the perverse effect
of forcing authors to fill every conceivable market niche in order to forestall
unsupervised third parties' preparation and dissemination of the very kinds of works
the authors feared would not meet their artistic standards. Second, not only does this
result disfavor authors, it also ultimately frustrates the "supply of good books" goal:
an ample supply of books to which the author could not properly attend is not a happy
substitute for a smaller supply of books that earn their author's approval.
Finally, let us take up the first example posed at the outset of this article: the user
rights claims of third parties who increase the audience for a copyrighted work by
redisseminating it to a new or larger subset of the public. These claims are not new
to digital media; for example, radio broadcasters once resisted paying public
performance royalties on the ground that the broadcasts served as free advertising
promoting the purchase of phonorecords of the musical composition. 2 In the past,

19.
Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ'g Group, II F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), appeal
pending.
20.
See Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
21.
See M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776 (D.N.J. 1923); see generally
Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing Rights Societies,

33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 332, 334-48 (1986) (discussing the development and protection of
performing rights in music).
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however, the defense that "I did you a favor by bringing your work before so many
more people" has not rallied the support of the courts. 22 Does the protest become
more appealing when the media of redissemination is digital? Certainly this media has
the capacity to publicize the work most effectively. Nonetheless, because the author
is not being compensated for the redissemination, one might conclude that the "favor"
of redissemination is not to be fervently wished for.
In a recent decision relating to this problem, the Second Circuit rejected the fair
use defense advanced by the operator of a "Dial Up" service. 3 The service allows
subscribers to listen in real time by telephone to remote radio broadcasts. The court
found no transformative value added by the service to the broadcasts; rather, the
service simply transported the remote radio programming to the local user via
telephone lines.24
In making the programs available to remote users, the service may have created a
new market for the programs, since, previously, the programs' market was purely
local. Thus, the service was not competing with the copyright owner's traditional
markets. The remote market was arguably a windfall, whose presence could not have
entered into the copyright owners' calculus of economic incentives. In addition to the
arguable irrelevance of the incentive rationale in this case, the supply of good books
argument might favor the service, since it is making the programming available to
more people. Moreover, the authorial integrity problem in the Seinfeld case is not
present here; the defendant is capturing the programs in their entirety, without
changes; it is not seeking to make a new and different work that builds on the
programs.
But if fair use exempts nontransformative redissemination of copyrighted works
to new audiences generated by new modes of exploitation, then what is left of
copyright when the new modes of exploitation rival the old? Here one can appreciate
the importance of the doctrine that technology-driven new markets nonetheless come
within the author's exclusive right. We can also anticipate that the persistence of this
doctrine, already challenged in some quarters (and weakened by the Supreme Court
in the "Betamax" case25), will determine the fate of authors' rights in a world of
increasingly clamorous user rights claims.
I will conclude with a hypothetical, based on a case recently filed in federal district
court in California. Defendant website operator posts, without authorization,
hundreds of articles from the Los Angeles Times and the WashingtonPost,and invites
websurfers to comment on the posted articles. Plaintiff newspapers contend that

22.
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
23.
See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998).
"Webcasting," through which local radio programming is retransmitted via the Internet,
24.
achieves a similar, albeit more widespread, result. Webcasts are not exempt from liability under section
I I I(a), although they may benefit from a statutory license for transmission of performances of phonograms

under new section I 14(d)(2). There is no similarly specific exemption for webcast transmissions of the
musical compositions recorded on the phonograms.
25.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (majority held
time-shifting of free broadcast television programs to be fair use because this home taping did not harm
the copyright owners' market for the work; the dissent stressed that the majority did not adequately

consider the impact of time-shifting on the video recorder's creation of new markets for broadcast works).

19991

COPYRIGHT AND INTERMEDIATE USERS' RIGHTS

defendant's site competes with theirs for web advertising and for readership.
Defendant responds that the fair use doctrine and the First Amendment protect his
postings because he is not only bringing the articles to a broader public, he2 6is
contributing to public debate by encouraging readers to respond to the postings.
Under traditional fair use principles, the defense should not prevail here: the
website operator is posting the entire text of the articles on a commercial website,"
and is adding no commentary of its own, although it is inviting that of others.
Moreover, if defendant is seeking to be a forum for third-party commentary on the
articles, it is not necessary to reproduce the articles; in the digital environment, a
hyperlink to the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post's webpages should
suffice. It will be most interesting, therefore, to see whether the court condemns the
defendant's enterprise as contrary to copyright, or whether the court entertains the fair
use defense. The latter event would herald a shift in copyright analysis from
enforcement of exclusive rights, to promotion of "access" to works of authorship,
regardless of (or despite) the author's own plans for the dissemination of the works.

26.
See Newspapers File Copyright-Infringement Suit Against Web Site (visited Nov. 30, 1998)
<http://www.freedomforum.org/technology/1998/10/7copyright.asp>.
27.
Although Free Republic, the website involved in this copyright infringement action, claims that
it is a noncommercial website, it is, nevertheless, willing to post ads and banners for other websites (and
indeed contains several such banners). See Free Republic (visited Oct. 22, 1998) <httpJ/www.fieerepublic.
com/about.htm>.

